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PUTTING A 'CHILL' ON CONTRACT MURDER: BRAUN V
SOLDIER OF FORTUNE AND TORT LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENT PUBLISHING
I. INTRODUCTION
A central issue in negligent publishing law is determining the stan-
dard of care to which a state can hold a publisher while satisfying the
First Amendment. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
declared that states cannot restrict publication by imposing liability
where they could not do so by statute.' States may not restrict publica-
tion in contravention of a publisher's First Amendment rights. The First
Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law that abridges the Free-
dom of Speech."'2 This freedom, and the concurrent limitation on state
action, is not, however, free from qualification.
3
In Braun v. Soldier of Fortune,4 the United States Court of Appeals for
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (rejecting lia-
bility for allegedly defamatory ad). The Court continued, "[t]he fear of damage
awards ... may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under
a criminal statute." Id.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Freedoms such as [association and airing griev-
ances] are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from
being stifled by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62
(1958) (discussing right of association in context of law compelling disclosure of
group membership lists)). The courts have sought to prevent regulations that
indirectly restrain First Amendment rights. See Note, The Chilling Effect in Consti-
tutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 842 (1969) (describing chilling effect some
laws have on certain protected activities). Although courts often use the term
chill in speech cases, many other cases discussing the chilling effect involve the
freedom of association. See, e.g., Bates, 361 U.S. 516 (requiring disclosure of
NAACP membership would chill free association by subjecting those on list to
harm and thus prevent potential members from joining). But see American Party
v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding restrictions on candidacy in light of
government interest in protecting integrity of nominating process by prohibiting
voters in primary from subsequently signing candidate petitions).
3. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) (holding constitutional or-
dinance that forbade use of "sound truck" on public streets). "To enforce free-
dom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary
in itself." Id; see also Metromedia, Inc v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981)
(noting that "at times First Amendment values must yield to other societal inter-
ests"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957) (noting that at time of
Bill of Rights, 10 of 14 states had laws prohibiting profanity); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) ("Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an
absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse."); American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921) ("[T]he word 'right' is
one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning
in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are
qualified.")
4. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
(625)
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the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue, holding:
[T]he First Amendment permits a state to impose upon a pub-
lisher liability for compensatory damages for negligently pub-
lishing a commercial advertisement where the ad on its face,
and without the need for investigation, makes it apparent that
there is a substantial danger of harm to the public.5
In so holding, the court established the constitutionality of a new stan-
dard of care for all publishers.
Before examining the Braun decision, some basic definitions and
limitations must be established. First, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween a mere transmitter and a publisher. For the purposes of this
Note, a transmitter is one who conveys a message between discreet par-
ties with no knowledge of the contents, such as the telephone company
or the postal service. 6 Courts generally do not hold transmitters liable
for the contents of the transmission. 7 A publisher, on the other hand, is
one who disseminates information with knowledge of the contents. 8
Courts have held publishers liable for the harm resulting from informa-
tion they disseminate. 9 In the context of electronic communication,
providers of services such as electronic mail are considered transmitters,
while a system operator (sysop) operating an electronic bulletin board is
a publisher.
Secondly, it is necessary to delineate the scope of the negligence to
be discussed. This Note is concerned with "negligent publishing" as
that term is used to refer to the publication of information that when
read and acted upon creates a risk of injury to third parties. This is
distinct from an action for defamation or invasion of privacy where the
harm results from the dissemination of the information itself. For exam-
ple, in Braun, the injury is the death of plaintiffs' father which was al-
leged to be proximately caused by an advertisement published by the
5. Id. at 1119 (footnotes omitted). The court would have been more accu-
rate if it had held that the First Amendment "does not prohibit" a state, as op-
posed to "permits" a state: The First Amendment limits, but does not expand, a
state's discretion.
6. The Restatement notes the difficulty of precise definitions in this area.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1976) (detailing what constitutes
publication). Transmitters may have common carrier status, imposing a duty to
serve all who apply. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment,
and Equal Access to Electronic Networks, 5 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 65, 73-91 (1992)
(defining common carrier and detailing duties owed).
7. Perritt, supra note 6, at 95-96.
8. Cf id. at 98 (defining publication in defamation context as act resulting in
communication to third person) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577
(1977)).
9. Generally, liability is contingent on knowledge or negligence as to
knowledge. Perritt, supra note 6, at 99; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 581 (suggesting liability for publisher only where "he knows or has reason to
know of its defamatory character").
626 [Vol. 38: p. 625
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defendant magazine offering a "gun for hire."' 0
This Note, in Section II, discusses the state of the law before Braun,
focusing on the protection given to commercial speech under the First
Amendment and recent developments in the area of tort liability. Sec-
tion III describes and analyzes the court's reasoning and conclusions.
Finally, Section IV discusses the likely impact of Braun on print and elec-
tronic publishing.
II. BACKGROUND
Negligent publishing law is negligence law operating under the con-
straints of First Amendment protection."I Consequently, it is useful to
consider both negligence and the First Amendment protection of speech
individually before examining the state of negligent publishing law it-
self. Because the Braun court applied Georgia law, this Note tailors the
discussion of negligence to that state's law.' 2 However, the importance
of the holding is not so much that it affirms the standard of care now
applicable in Georgia, but that the Braun court found that standard to be
constitutional.
A. Negligence
Under Georgia law, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action for negli-
gence must establish four elements: (1) that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a legal duty of care; (2) that the defendant breached this duty;
(3) that there was a causal connection between this breach and the plain-
tiff's resultant injury; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered actual harm.'"
Georgia recognizes a "general duty one owes to all the world not to
subject them to unreasonable risk of harm."' 14 The creation of an un-
reasonable risk thus constitutes a breach of one's duty of care. In deter-
10. 968 F.2d at 1112.
11. See Jonathan M. Hoffman, Soldiers of Misfortune, A.B.A. SEC. OF TORT &
INS. PRACTICE (Summer 1991) (summarizing recent cases involving negligent
publishing or broadcasting). Harm caused by defamation or libel is beyond the
scope of this Note. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (discussing "actual malice" requirement as part of plaintiff's case against
publisher for false advertisement that injured plaintiff).
12. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1114-i6. In diversity cases, federal courts must fol-
low the law of the state in which they sit. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 491 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Ala-
bama law requires that the court apply the law of the state in which the injury
occurred. See Bodner v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 392 So.2d 1161, 1162 (Ala. 1980).
Because the injuries in this case occurred in Georgia, the federal court applied
Georgia law. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1114.
13. Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. 1982) (quoting
Lee Street Auto Sales, Inc. v. Warren, 116 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960)).
14. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d at 695. Whether a duty exists is a matter of law to
be decided by the court. First Fed. Say. Bank v. Fretthold, 394 S.E.2d 128, 131
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Adler's Package Shop v. Parker, 378 S.E.2d 323, 327
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989)).
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mining whether the risk is unreasonable, Georgia applies a risk-utility
analysis similar to that set forth by Judge Learned Hand in United States
v. Carroll Towing, Co.: 5 If the magnitude of the risk outweighs the utility
of the conduct, the court deems the conduct unreasonable. 16 Factors a
court should consider in measuring the risk include the "social value of
the interest imperiled . . ., the probability of harm, and the likely extent
of that harm."1 7 In measuring the utility of the conduct, a court should
look at the social usefulness of the enterprise, the value of that method
of conducting it, and the extent to which a less dangerous method might
advance the interest.18
Assuming the plaintiff has proven duty and breach-or, applying
the risk-utility analysis, the creation of an unreasonable risk-the plain-
tiff still must establish "a legally attributable connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the alleged injury."' 19 An intervening act of a
third party will normally break the causal connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.20 Foreseeable conduct by
the third party, however, will not sever the causal connection, even
where the third party acts illegally.
2 1
Whether an intervening act is foreseeable depends on the likeli-
hood of its occurrence:
An event is not regarded as being foreseeable if it is one in the
nature of an extraordinary coincidence, or a conjunction of cir-
cumstances, or which would not occur save under exceptional
circumstances; if it is unusual or unlikely to happen, or if it a rare
event in experience, or if other and contingent experience preponderate
largely in causing the injurious effect.
22
15. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. Id.; see also Hanchey v. Hart, 171 S.E.2d 918, 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)
(discussing magnitude of risk of automobile collision in light of social usefulness
of sawmill).
17. Hanchey, 171 S.E.2d at 921.
18. Id. The Hanchey court borrowed heavily from Judge Learned Hand's
formula set forth in Carroll Towing Co. v. United States, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) ("[L]iability depends on whether [the burden] is less than [the injury]
multiplied by [the probability of injury]."); see also Johnson v. Thompson, 143
S.E.2d 51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (outlining risk utility balance used in Georgia).
19. Rosinek v. Cox Enter., Inc., 305 S.E.2d 393, 394 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)
(affirming that leaving week's daily papers in yard not proximate cause of harm
from burglary).
20. Rosinek, 305 S.E.2d at 394-95; see also Craine v. United States, 722 F.2d
1523, 1525 (11 th Cir. 1984) (applying Georgia law) (holding boat-owner not
liabile where boat renter was intoxicated); Razdan v. Parzen, 278 S.E.2d 687,
688-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (holding issue for jury whether criminal conduct of
bogus repairman broke causation when landlord negligently gave him keys).
21. Rosinek, 305 S.E.2d at 394-95 ("[I]f the criminal act was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct, the causal connection be-
tween that conduct and the injury is not broken.").
22. Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 172 S.E.2d 344, 349 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)
(holding not foreseeable when clearing gas line with compressed air that cus-
628 [Vol. 38: p. 625
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Thus, if a situation implicates no constitutional rights, a plaintiff will
prevail where the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care, exposes the
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk and causes a foreseeable injury. Where
constitutional rights are implicated, however, the analysis becomes more
complicated.
B. First Amendment Protection
The First Amendment prohibits the imposition of liability where lia-
bility would unduly burden free speech. 23 The First Amendment, how-
ever, does not accord all speech the same protection. 24 Because the
tomer would remove gas cap, causing explosion); see also Warner v. Arnold, 210
S.E.2d 350, 352 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (stating proximate cause exists where
wrongdoer "had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such a criminal act
would be committed").
23. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945) (noting Supreme Court
has duty "to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power
begins").
24. Generally, courts allow speech to be subjected to regulation only to the
extent necessary to further a legitimate government interest. See NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Precision of regulation must be the touch-
stone."). The test to determine if regulation of noncommercial speech is
constitutional is whether it is reasonable as to time, place and manner. See Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 435 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1981) (holding billboard re-
striction unreasonable as to time, place and manner). Given a substantial
governmental interest, noncommercial speech may even be barred. See Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925) ("That a state in the exercise of its police
power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the
public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the
public peace, is not open to question."); see also Schaeffer v. United States, 251
U.S. 466, 474 (1920) (upholding conviction of publisher who had published arti-
cle disparaging U.S. forces and commitment to World War I in German lan-
guage newspaper). The test to determine if regulation can bar noncommercial
speech is "whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenk v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Other speech may be entirely outside First Amendment
Protection and not require such a test. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating "no constitutional value in false statements of
fact"); Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (holding obscenity not protected); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (barring "fighting words" from First
Amendment protection); Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52 ("The most stringent protection
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and
causing panic."). For discussion of the law on First Amendment protection of
commercial speech, see infra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
Courts have also sought to protect the individual from harm caused by
others. For example, courts have upheld the common law tort of nuisance: "A
man's right to erect what he pleases on his own land will not justify him in main-
taining a nuisance or in carrying on a business or trade that is offensive to his
neighbors." Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522 (1897) (affirming con-
viction of persons who enclosed public lands with their own); see also Baltimore &
Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 330 (1883) (allowing action
for nuisance where smoke from chimney enters neighbor's church, even though
height of chimney satisfied city regulations); Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 391-
92 (1889) (upholding constitutionality of statute limiting height of fences).
5
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speech involved in Braun was commercial speech, this Section focuses on
the limitations on imposing liability in that context.
25
25. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117. A second area in which the Court has limited
First Amendment protection is where speech relates to illegal activity. The
Court has consistently stated that illegal activity is not protected by the First
Amendment. For example, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, the Court's first step in determining whether the First Amendment
protected commercial speech was determining whether the speech concerned
lawful activity. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). All parties agreed that the advertise-
ment related to lawful activity-using electricity. Id. Justice Blackmun, concur-
ring, emphasized that a state should not be able to suppress information
regarding the availability of a product if it is legal. Id. at 574 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Note, however, that merely advocating illegal activity is not suffi-
cient to remove First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (overturning prosecution of Ku Klux Klan leader who
urged law breaking on grounds that states cannot proscribe mere general advo-
cacy when such advocacy is not directed at inciting "imminent lawless activity").
In Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of a commission's order that a newspaper could not
publish employment advertisements under the headings of "Male Interest" and
"Female Interest." Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973). The commission, pursuant to an ordinance,
prohibited sex discrimination in employment. Id. at 378. The Court found that
sex-designated columns in advertising implied a willingness to discriminate in
hiring, an activity made illegal under the ordinance. Id. at 388-89. In dicta, the
Court declared, "[w]e have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be
forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prosti-
tutes." Id. at 388. The Court further noted that a state could also constitution-
ally prohibit placing advertisements under the headings "Narcotics for Sale" or
"Prostitutes Wanted." Id. The Court conceded that the sex discrimination was
not overt, and the result of the advertisement was to demonstrate that the adver-
tiser was willing to illegally discriminate in employment. Id. at 388. Commenta-
tors have noted that "[t]he Court's opinion in Pittsburgh Press leaves open the
many difficult questions concerning the manner in which advertising may be 're-
lated to' unlawful conduct." See EDWIN P. ROME AND WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, COR-
PORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 43 (1985).
In a case similar to Pittsburgh Press, the court concluded that an advertise-
ment which offered a furnished apartment in a "white home" was violative of
§ 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act. See Hunter v. United States, 459 F.2d 205,
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). The court refused, however, to grant
injunctive relief because other papers carrying similar advertisements were not
sued. Hunter, 324 F.Supp. 529, 535 (D. Md. 1971). On appeal, the Hunter court
did not disturb this ruling. 459 F.2d at 221.
In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court emphasized that the activity advertised-
abortion services-was legal in the state in which performed (New York). Bige-
low v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975). At the time of advertising, however,
abortion was not legal in Virginia. Id. The Court held that the Virginia court
could not prevent the advertisements then because they were informational and
concerned activities that were legal in New York. Id. at 824. The Court noted
that the state of Virginia "could not have regulated the advertiser's activity in
[another state], and obviously could not have proscribed the activity in that
[s]tate." Id. at 822-23. The Court explained, however, that the issue of whether
the First Amendment protected an ad proposing an illegal activity in another
state was not before the Court. Id. at 828 n.14. In his dissent, Justice Rhenquist
suggested that the Court entertained the idea that such speech may be pro-
tected. Id. at 834 (Rhenquist, J. dissenting).
6
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The Supreme Court defined commercial speech as that which
merely "propos[es] a commercial transaction."' 26 The commercial
speech doctrine began in Valentine v. Chrestensen,2 7 in a manner later de-
scribed by Justice Douglas as "almost offhand."' 28 In Chrestensen, a pub-
lisher had produced a handbill that contained an advertisement on one
side and a political message on the other.2 9 The publisher sought to
enjoin the police from enforcing a city prohibition on distributing com-
mercial handbills. 30 In ruling that the city's regulation was constitu-
tional, and thus enforceable, the Supreme Court stated:
This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper
places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating infor-
mation and disseminating opinion and that ... [the states] may
not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public
thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution im-
poses no such restraint on government as respects purely com-
mercial advertising.
3 1
Similarly, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, the Court stated that "there [was] no claim that the transactions proposed in
the forbidden advertisements [were] themselves illegal in any way." Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1976). The Court explained, therefore, that any issues concerning this category
of unprotected commercial speech-relating to illegal activities-was not before
the Court or forclosed by the case at bar. Id. at 770. The Court noted that if any
commercial speech lacked protection "it must be distinguished by its content."
Id. at 761. The Court has subsequently interpreted this statement to mean that
if the content concerns illegal activity, the First Amendment does not protect the
speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("Indeed, in recent years
this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech unless the
expression itself was flawed in some way, [including] because it was ... related
to unlawful activity.").
Finally, in Board of Trustees v. Fox, the Court noted that the parties had
agreed that the speech in question "propose[d] a lawful transaction, [was] not
misleading and [was] therefore entitled to First Amendment protection." Board
of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear
that the First Amendment does not protect speech related to illegal activity.
26. Fox, 492 U.S. at 473 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762). The
Court noted that commercial speech remains so even if it discusses important
issues as well. Id. at 469.
27. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
28. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (discussing commercial speech in context of whether taxpayer could
claim deduction for costs associated with publicity to encourage voters to cast
ballots a certain way); see also Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 384 (tracing commercial
speech doctrine to "the brief opinion in Valentine v. Chrestensen").
29. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 53.
30. Id. at 54.
31. Id. Chrestensen involved a flyer advertising tours through a submarine.
Id. at 53. The flyer was pasted back to back with a protest notice. Id. The court
determined that the respondant affixed the advertisement to the protest notice
simply to evade the statute prohibiting commercial flyers. Id. at 55. The flyer
remained commercial speech. Id.
NOTE
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Because Chrestensen, the Court has retreated from such absolutism.
3 2
In Bigelow v. Virginia,3 3 a Virginia newspaper published an advertisement
offering placement services for abortions to be performed in New
York.3 4 Although abortion was legal in New York at the time, the pub-
lisher was convicted under a Virginia statute prohibiting the encourage-
ment of procurement of an abortion.3 5 The Supreme Court declared
the statute unconstitutional, stating that "the Virginia courts erred in
their assumptions that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First
Amendment protection."'3 6 Rather, the Court held that a regulation
that restricts commercial speech must be assessed by "weighing it
against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation."
'3 7
Subsequently, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council,38 the Supreme Court conceded that Bigelow may not
have fully resolved the question of commercial speech's First Amend-
ment protection.3 9 In Virginia Pharmacy the issue was whether a state
could prevent a pharmacist from advertising prescription drug prices.
40
The Court stated that "speech does not lose its First Amendment pro-
tection because money is spent to project it."' 4 1 The Court continued,
"[i]f there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment
protection . . . it must be distinguished by its content."142 The Court
concluded that commercial speech is not so removed from the "exposi-
tion of ideas" and "truth" that the First Amendment does not protect
it.4 3
32. In Pittsburgh Press the Court specifically refused to accept plaintiff's ar-
gument that "commercial speech should be accorded a higher level of protec-
tion than [suggested in] Chrestensen." Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388. In Virginia
Pharmacy, however, the Court acknowledged that the First Amendment pro-
tected the right to receive information. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757 (citing
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)).
33. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
34. Id. at 811-12.
35. Id. at 811, 822.
36. Id. at 825. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court reflected that in Bigelow "the
notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene." Id. at
759.
37. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826. The Court stated that "[a]dvertising, like all
public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legiti-
mate public interest." Id. The Court distinguished Chrestensen. Id. at 822. The
advertisement in Bigelow did more than "simply propose a commercial transac-
tion"-it disseminated material "of clear public interest." Id.
38. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
39. Id. at 760 (noting that Bigelow left "[slome fragment of hope for the
continuing validity of a 'commercial speech' exception").
40. Id. at 749-50.
41. Id. at 761 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976) (discussing
constitutionality of Act limiting political contributions and expenditures)).
42. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. The Court noted that merely be-
cause speech pertains to a "commercial subject" does not bar First Amendment
protection. Id.
43. Id. at 762 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
632 [Vol. 38: p. 625
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The Court relied on Virginia Pharmacy when deciding Central Hudson
Gas v. Public Service Commission.4 4 The Court interpreted Virginia Phar-
macy as protecting commercial speech from "unwarranted governmental
regulation."'45 Central Hudson Gas concerned a regulation prohibiting
advertising by electric companies which "promote[d] the use of electric-
ity."'46 The purpose of the regulation was to conserve energy.4 7 The
Court held that the regulation was unconstitutional because it was an
unnecessarily broad restriction on speech. 48 The Court emphasized the
societal importance of advertising, noting that "some accurate informa-
tion is better than no information at all."'49 While recognizing the need
for some First Amendment protection, however, the Court stated that
"[t]he Constitution ... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expressions."
'50
In determining whether regulation of the commercial speech in Cen-
tral Hudson Gas was constitutional the Court established a four part test:
(1) the regulations must concern lawful activity and not be misleading;
(2) there must be a substantial government interest; (3) the regulation
must advance that interest directly; and (4) the regulation must be no
more expansive than necessary.
5 1
The Court re-examined this test in Board of Trustees v. Fox.5 2 Univer-
sity officials refused to allow a company to demonstrate its products in
university dormitories. 53 Several students brought suit claiming that the
(1942) (deciding that "fighting words are not protected by First Amendment);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (declaring that obscene material
not protected by First Amendment). The Court determined that the consumer
and society have an interest in the free flow of information. Virginia Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 764.
44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
45. Id. at 561 (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62).
46. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 559 (quoting New York Public Service
Commission regulation (not provided)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 570.
49. Id. at 562 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977)
(discussing validity of restraint prohibiting attorneys from advertising services)).
A series of cases illustrate the Court's commitment to protecting advertising.
Foremost is Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, where the Court held unconstitutional a
ban on attorney advertising. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977). But cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (hold-
ing state or state bar may prohibit certain direct contacts by attorneys to pro-
spective clients).
50. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (citing Ohlarik, 436 U.S. at 455-
57);see also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (stating that
noncommercial and commercial speech are not equal) (citing Virginia Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 770-73); Young v. American Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69
n.32 (1976) (distinguishing between commercial advertising and ideological
communication and allowing more regulation of the former).
51. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
52. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
53. Id. at 472.
9
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university violated their First Amendment rights by preventing them
from meeting with their "commercial invitees."'54 The Court, however,
interpreted Central Hudson Gas as not requiring courts to apply a "least-
restrictive-means" test to determine if regulation of commercial speech
was valid; rather, there need only be a "fit" between the regulation and
the interest sought to be protected. 55 The Court noted that to hold the
state to the heavier burden of proving they used the "least-restrictive-
means" of regulating commercial speech would dilute the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech.
5 6
Thus, the Supreme Court has confirmed the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech, and has held that commercial
speech may be subjected to greater regulation by the courts. Indeed,
the Court will uphold any restrictions on commercial speech as long as
there is a "fit" between the government's legitimate interest and the
means used to restrict such speech.
C. Negligent Publishing
The varying protection given to different types of speech affects the
standard of care to which a state can hold a publisher in a negligent
publishing case.
Early attempts to hold publishers liable for negligent publishing
arose where advertised products subsequently caused injuries. For ex-
ample, Yuhas v. Mudge concerned a suit brought by persons injured by
firecrackers. 5 7 The plaintiffs asserted that the magazine that advertized
the firecrackers had a duty to investigate the product for safety.5 8 The
New Jersey Court of Appeals rejected this claim, holding that "no such
legal duty rests upon respondents unless it [sic] undertakes to guaran-
tee, warrant or endorse the product." 59
A California court rejected a similar argument in Walters v. Seventeen
Magazine.60 The Walters plaintiff was a minor who suffered toxic shock
after using tampons advertised in the defendant magazine. 6 1 The plain-
tiff claimed that by placing the advertisement among articles on wo-
men's health issues, the magazine lead young readers to believe the
magazine endorsed the product. 6 2 The court rejected the claim,
asserting:
[W]e are loathe to create a new tort of negligently failing to
54. Id.
55. Id. at 477-80.
56. Id. at 481 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
57. 322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
58. Id. at 825.
59. Id.
60. 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Cal. App. Ct. 1987).
61. Id. at 101.
62. Id.
634 [Vol. 38: p. 625
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investigate the safety of an advertised product. Such a tort
would require publications to maintain huge staffs scrutinizing
and testing each product offered. The enormous costs ...
would deter many magazines from accepting advertising, has-
tening their demise from lack of revenue.
6 3
The court noted that those who accepted advertising and complied with
the investigation requirements would increase the cost of the magazine
beyond the reach of buyers, while those who did not comply could be
bankrupted by tort liability. 64
In Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co. ,65 however, a New
York court imposed liability on a publisher who failed to verify a tele-
phone number in an adult advertisement. 66 The advertisement incor-
rectly listed the plaintiffs' number, resulting in a deluge of obscene
calls. 6 7 The court rejected the defendant's claim that a publisher should
be able to rely on the text submitted by the advertiser. 68 Instead, the
court applied a risk-utility analysis, weighing the risk of harm against the
burden of preventing this harm by verifying the numbers. 69 Applying
this test, the court imposed liability, noting that "[t]he suggestive nature
of the text of these advertisements ... renders it highly foreseeable that
what happened would happen if the telephone number was wrong."
70
However, the Blinick court, like the courts in Yuhas and Walters, never
considered the constitutionality of imposing liability.
More recently, two federal courts squarely faced the issue of impos-
ing liability on a publisher for harm allegedly arising from a personal
service advertisement. In Norwood v. Soldier-of Fortune Magazine,7 ' the de-
fendant sought dismissal of plaintiff's claim for injuries received during
alleged attempts on his life. 72 Norwood claimed that his attackers were
63. Id. at 854.
64. Walters, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03. The court noted that "[p]erhaps this
dire possibility is one reason the United States Supreme Court has been so vigi-
lant about linking commercial speech to the First Amendment." Id. (citations
omitted). One California case did hold that a publisher who endorsed a product
could be liable under the theory of negligent misrepresentation. See Hanberry v.
Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. App. Ct. 1969). The court in Walters found
that case "inapposite." Walters, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
65. 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), appeal dismissed, 337 N.Y.S.2d
859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
66. Id. at 855.
67. Id. at 854.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 855.
70. Id. The court also noted that the burden on the publisher was slight, as
it would take "only a minute or so" to verify the number. Id. Another line of
cases has emerged in text books and "how to" books. See generally Hoffman,
supra note 11.
71. 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
72. Id. at 1402. The defendant in both Norwood and Eimann v. Soldier of For-
tune Magazine, Inc. is the same defendant as in Braun. See Eimann v. Soldier of
1993] NOTE 635
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hired through two advertisements placed in the defendant magazine. 73
One of these advertisements was the same as that in Braun; the other
read:
GUN FOR HIRE. NAM sniper instructor. SWAT. Pistol, rifle,
security specialist, body guard, courier plus. All jobs consid-
ered. Privacy guaranteed.
74
The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating
that the court could constitutionally impose liability on the magazine.
75
The court noted that if a publisher infringed on the rights of others, it
would have to "take the consequences of [its] own temerity."' 76 The
court rejected the defendant's argument that no reasonable jury could
conclude that the advertisements in question gave rise to a foreseeable
risk of harm. 7 7 Further, the court refused to find that the actions of
third party lawbreakers broke the chain of causation.
78
The Fifth Circuit considered a similar scenario in Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine.79 There, the plaintiff's daughter had been killed in a
contract murder set up by the victim's husband.8 0 The killer had been
contacted through an ad in the defendant's magazine, which read:
EX-MARINES-67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialist-
jungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments, U.S. or
overseas.
8 1
The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury verdict, refusing to hold the
magazine liable. The court reasoned that the publisher had no duty to
refrain from publishing what it termed "a facially innocuous advertise-
Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024
(1990). Both Savage and Doutre were defendants in Norwood.
73. Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at 1397-98.
74. Id. at 1398. The ad also supplied a name and telephone number. Id.
For the text of the advertisement in Braun, see infra note 89 and accompanying
text.
75. Id. at 1402.
76. Id. (citing 34 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 1326). The
Court considered "inappropriate, to say the least," defendants' attempt to anal-
ogize to Sullivan. Id. at 1399.
77. Id. at 1402. The court singled out the phrases "gun for hire," "profes-
sional mercenary," "all jobs" and "discreet and very private" as indicative of the
risk. Id.
78. Id. at 1402-03. The court relied on Franko v. Bunyard, which held a gun
seller liable where he negligently sold a gun that was subsequently used in a
robbery and shooting. See Franko v. Bunyard, 547 S.W.2d 91 (Ark.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 835 (1977). The Norwood court found the alleged consequences in Nor-
wood to be "at least as foreseeable as [in Franko]." Norwood, 651 F. Supp. at
1403.
79. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
80. Id. at 831.
81. Id. The ad contained a contact telephone number. Id. "DI" was short
for "drill instructor" and "M.E." referred to multi-engine planes. Id.
636 [Vol. 38: p. 625
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ment." 8 2 Assuming a duty of care to the public, the court applied a risk-
utility analysis and concluded that the defendant had not breached its
duty of care. 83 The court acknowledged that "[t]he prospect of ad-in-
spired crime represents a threat of serious harm."'84 However, the court
found the burden of preventing this harm was too great to impose on
the publisher, describing the standard of conduct used as "more exact-
ing than a duty to investigate. ' 8
5
Although the court never expressly reached the First Amendment
considerations, it appears to have acted with them in mind.8 6 The court
noted that an expert witness testified that an advertiser's willingness to
undertake illegal activities could not be determined from the content of
an advertisement. 87 Were publishers to reject all ambiguous advertise-
ments, the court continued, they could potentially lose enough revenue
to prevent them from publishing altogether.
88
Thus, prior to Braun, the law of negligent publishing was not set-
82. Id. at 834, 838.
83. Id. at 835-36. The court cited tojudge Learned Hand's formula in Car-
roll Towing Co. v. United States. Id. at 835 (citing Carroll Towing Co, v. United
States, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)).
84. Id. Evidence in the case showed that in 10 years the magazine had pub-
lished 2000 advertisements, nine of which could be linked to criminal activity.
Id. As evidenced by Savage's ad being at issue in both Norwood and Braun, at
least one was used multiple times. The court noted in Eimann that Hearn, the
advertiser, had met his girlfriend, Debbie Bannister, through the ad: Hearn
killed Bannister's husband and her sister's ex-husband a month before the
Eimann killing. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 832.
85. Id. at 835. The jury was charged to find knowledge of the ad's offer to
commit illegal activity even if it were only apparent from the advertisement's
context, which included the nature of the magazine, its articles, advertisements,
and readership. The magazine would be held liable if it should have known that
the advertisement "reasonably could be ineterpreted as an offer to engage in
illegal activity." Id.
Michael Meyerson argues that the district court's standard does not impose
a heavy burden on the publisher. Michael I. Meyerson, This Gun For Hire: Danc-
ing in the Dark of the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 267, 275 (1990). He
proposes that publishers with a history of dangerous advertisements divide all
proposed advertisements into three categories: those explicitly proposing ille-
gal transactions; those clearly not proposing such transactions; and those that
are ambiguous. Id. The publisher would reject those in the first group, accept
those in the second, and edit those in the third to clear up any ambiguity. Id.
He continued: "It is not too great a burden to require a publisher with a history
like that of Soldier of Fortune to devise language that would avoid the ambiguity
and prevent the use of codewords that result in a 90% understanding that crimi-
nality is afoot." Id.
86. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 836 (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763).
87. Id. at 836. For a summary of the expert's findings, see infra note 139-
41.
88. Id. at 837 (citing Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984) (upholding ban on liquor advertising);
Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
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tied. Absent a duty as an endorser, publishers were not liable for de-
fects in products they advertised. However, in Blinick, the court held
that liability could be imposed where the advertisement contained a mis-
take that led to foreseeable harm, even where the publisher did not
cause the mistake. In Norwood, the district court held that liability could
constitutionally be imposed on a publisher of a personal service adver-
tisement. Eimann, however, limited this liability, saying that there was
no duty to reject or investigate ambiguous advertisements. Thus, the
precise standard to which a state could hold a publisher without violat-
ing the First Amendment remained unsettled.
III. BRA UN v. SOLDIER OF FORTUNE
A. Facts
From June, 1985 through March, 1986, Soldier of Fortune Maga-
zine (SOF) carried an advertisement reading in part:
GUN FOR HIRE: 37-year-old professional mercenary desires
jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discreet and very private. Body guard,
courier, and other special skills. All jobs considered.
8 9
The advertisement further provided contact telephone numbers and an
address. 90 Bruce Gastwirth responded to the advertisement through an
intermediary, who hired the advertiser, Michael Savage, to kill Richard
Braun. 9 1 Savage then hired Sean Trevor Doutre to carry out the kill-
ing.9 2 Doutre shot Braun and his son, Michael, as they were leaving
Braun's home, killing Braun and wounding Michael. 95
Michael and his brother, Ian, brought an action against Soldier of
Fortune Magazine and its parent company, Omega Group, Ltd. (hereaf-
ter collectively SOF), for the wrongful death of their father; Michael
brought a separate action for personal injury.94 They sought to hold
89. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 757 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (M.D.
Ala. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1110 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993). Joan
Steele, the advertising manager of SOF, had edited the advertisement, changing
"[a]ny and all jobs considered" to the published "[a]ll jobs considered." Id.
Her explanation was that the former was too vague. Id. The advertiser had
given her permission to make any necessary edits. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Braun was a business associate of Gastwirth, who had previously
arranged at least three attempts on Braun's life. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028
(1993).
92. Braun, 757 F. Supp. at 1326-27. Doutre had initially contacted Savage
after seeing the advertisement himself, and offered to work for him. Id. at 1327.
93. Id. at 1326-27. Braun managed to roll out of the car, but Doutre then
shot him in the back of the head. Id. Doutre then took aim at Michael, but left
without firing again. Id. at 1327.
94. Id. at 1326. The two actions were brought separately, and consolidated
by the court. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
[Vol. 38: p. 625
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SOF liable on the ground that the magazine "negligently published a
personal service advertisement ... which created an unreasonable risk
.... -95 The jury awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages on the
wrongful death claim and also awarded Michael Braun compensatory
and punitive damages on his personal injury claim.9 6
B. Discussion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the jury verdict, holding that the First Amendment did not pro-
hibit imposing liability on a publisher that negligently publishes an ad
that, on its face, conveys a substantial danger of harm to the public. 9 7 In
reaching this conclusion, the court divided the analysis into two issues:
duty and causation.9 8 Because causation is an issue of fact for the jury,
and therefore subject to deferential review, the discussion here focuses
only on the issue of duty of care.9 9
On the issue of duty, the court examined whether SOF owed any
95. Braun, 757 F. Supp. at 1326.
96. Id. The jury awarded Michael $375,000 for his personal injuries and
$10 million in punitive damages. Id. The brothers were awarded $2 million on
the wrongful death claim. Id. Michael Braun accepted a remittitur reducing his
punitive damages to $2 million. Id. at 1330-31.
97. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119.
98. Id. at 1114-21.
99. Id. at 1121. SOF contended that the actions of Gastwirth and Doutre
were unforeseeable, and thus an intervening cause of the injuries. Id. Applying
deferential review, the court refused to overturn the jury determination. Id. at
1122. This conclusion is supported by the testimony at the trial that SOF had
been contacted by investigators on two occasions involving crimes linked to ad-
vertisements in its magazine. Id. at 1112-13. Further, the plaintiffs showed that
SOF subscribed to a clipping service which sent the magazine any articles in
which it was mentioned; several newspapers and some national magazines had
carried articles concerning the links between crime and the advertisements. Id.
at 1113 nn.1-2. Despite this service, the former managing editor and the current
advertising editor claimed to be unaware that other crimes had been linked to
their advertisements. Id. at 1113. This conclusion is permissible under the tests
of foreseeability set forth in Standard Oil Co. v. Harris. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Harris, 172 S.E.2d 344, 349 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969). Standard Oil sets forth that
"foreseeability requires only that one having a responsible relationship to the
situation anticipate that which is likely to happen." Id.
The Eimann court posed an interesting foreseeability question under its ex-
amination of proximate causation: Whether one who advertised high speed cars
would be liable when a driver exceeds the speed limit. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 836.
The court questioned whether there would only be liability by such reasoning if
the magazine especially appealed to drivers, or carried advertisements for radar
detectors. Id. Significantly, in Braun the court did not depend on the context of
the advertisement, but only "on its face." Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116. The plaintiff
apparently tried to show foreseeability based on historical links between adver-
tising in the magazine and violent attacks, introducing evidence that the defend-
ant subscribed to a clipping service which would have delivered articles raising
this possibility. Id. at 1112-13 & 1113 n.2.
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duty to the plaintiffs. 10 0 The court then applied a risk-utility analysis to
determine whether the standard of care set forth by the district court
was appropriate.' 0 ' After determining that it was a proper standard
under common law, the court looked at whether it was constitutional
under the First Amendment. 10 2 Finally, the court scrutinized the jury
verdict to ascertain whether the application of this standard was consti-
tutional on the facts before it.'
0 3
The court first determined that the publisher did owe the plaintiffs a
duty of care.10 4 Appellants contended that they owed no duty to the
public in publishing personal service advertisements. 10 5 The court re-
jected this contention, concluding that "[SOF's] position is clearly in-
consistent with Georgia law."'
0 6
Having established that a duty existed, the court examined the risk-
utility analysis undertaken by the lower court to determine whether the
risk posed by the advertisement was an unreasonable one.' 0 7 The argu-
ment before the court centered on the instructions to the jury, which
read, in part:
The Plaintiffs must prove that the ad in question contained a
clearly identifiable unreasonable risk, that the offer in the ad is
one to commit a serious violent crime, including murder. Now,
while Defendants owe a duty of reasonable care to the public,
the magazine publisher does not have a duty to investigate
every ad it publishes.'
0 8
The magazine asserted that the lower court erred in applying the
risk-utility analysis, analogizing to Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, where the
jury had been instructed to find liability where the advertisement "could
reasonably be interpreted as an offer to engage in illegal activity."' 10 9
The Braun court, however, distinguished Eimann concluding that the in-
structions below had "properly conveyed to the jury that it could not
impose liability on SOF if Savage's ad posed only an unclear or insub-
stantial risk of harm to the public and if SOF would bear a dispropor-
100. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1114-15.
101. Id. at 1115-16.
102. Id. at 1116-20.
103. Id. at 1120-21.
104. Id. at 1114.
105. Id.
106. Id. Because the issue of duty is a question of law, the Circuit Court
subjected the lower court's determination of the standard of care to de novo re-
view. Id. (citing Newell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 904 F.2d 644,
649 (11th Cir. 1990))
107. Id. at 1115-16.
108. Id. at 1113.
109. Id. at 1115 (citing Eimann, 880 F.2d at 837). An alternative ground for
finding liability was if "the relation to illegal activity appears on the ad's face."
Id.
640 [Vol. 38: p. 625
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tionately heavy burden in avoiding this risk." 1 0 Notably, the court
agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the instruction in Eimann imposed too
great a burden on a publisher, because it would force publishers to re-
ject even ambiguous advertisements."' The narrow instructions in
Braun placed a lesser burden on SOF than the instructions in Eimann,
the court stated."12
After reaching this conclusion, the court considered SOF's conten-
tion that the First Amendment forbade a negligence standard from be-
ing imposed."13 The court assumed the speech in question was
commercial speech, and recognized that, as such, it was protected by the
First Amendment." l4 The court conceded that "[tihis cases poses a
greater risk" of chilling commercial speech than do most commercial
speech cases, because the advertisement was published not by the
speaker, but by a third party who has a lesser financial interest in pro-
moting the message." 5 The court concluded, however, that the narrow
instructions and " 'modified' negligence standard" used by the lower
court were within the constitutional bounds of the First Amendment." 6
The court relied on Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 117 in asserting that the
Supreme Court has not rejected a negligence standard for
publishing." 18
SOF further argued that, because of the economic burden of liabil-
ity, the decision endangered noncommercial speech and thus violated
the First Amendment. 119 The magazine's argument had two compo-
110. Id. at 1116. This conclusion was based on "the district court's use of
phrases like 'clear and present danger' and 'clearly identifiable unreasonable
risk.'" Id.
111. Id. "The Fifth Circuit correctly observed that virtually anything might
involve illegal activity." Id. (citing Eimann, 880 F.2d at 837). For a discussion of
one interpretation of the burden in Eimann, see supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
112. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116.
113. Id. at 1116-20. However, SOF conceded that a negligence standard is
proper if the advertisement openly solicits illegal activity. Id. at 1116.
114. Id. (noting that Supreme Court recognized that speech which, "like
Savage's ad, does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' " is pro-
tected by First Amendment) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
115. Id. at 1117-18 (citing Lisa F. Firenze, Note, Publishers'Liability for Com-
mercial Advertisements: Testing the Limits of the First Amendment, 23 COLUM.J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 137, 149 (1980)).
116. Id. at 1119. The court noted approvingly the emphasis the lower court
had placed on construing this narrowly; only if it presented a "clearly identifi-
able unreasonable risk" could liability be imposed. Id.
117. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
118. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1118-19. The court noted that because some cases
allow for liability based on negligence in speech otherwise protected by the First
Amendment, Georgia tort law should similarly be able to constitutionally im-
pose liability. Id.
119. Id. at 1118.
1993] NOTE
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nents: first, that the liability in general would threaten the viability of
publishing; and second, that the judgment of the lower court, in particu-
lar, would put them out of business, "depriv[ing] public debate of SOF's
protected, non-commercial speech."' 20
The court rejected these arguments, concluding "the First Amend-
ment permits a state to impose upon a publisher liability for compensa-
tory damages for negligently publishing a commercial advertisement
where the ad on its face, and without the need for investigation, makes it
apparent that there is a substantial danger of harm to the public."'
2'
The fact that the standard did not impose a duty to investigate, and that
the advertisement itself must warn the publisher of a substantial danger
of harm to the public, reduced the burden on publishers and thus pre-
vented a chill on the press.' 22
The court then subjected the jury finding on negligence to in-
dependent review to determine whether it contravened the protection of
the First Amendment.12 3 The court concluded that the "combination of
sinister terms makes it apparent that there was a substantial danger of
harm to the public."' 24 The court specifically noted the elements of the
advertisement which brought them to that conclusion: the terms "Gun
for Hire" and "professional mercenary"; the references to confidential-
ity; and the fact that the advertisement listed legitimate jobs involving
use of a gun, followed by "all jobs" considered.1 25 The court stated that
these terms implied that illegal jobs would be considered.
126
In a brief dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Eschbach agreed with the
majority's interpretation of the law. 12 7 However, he differed on the ap-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1119 (footnote omitted). The court noted that "a different rule
would apply to presumed damages or punitive damages." Id. at n.7 (citing Gertz,
418 U.S. at 348-50).
122. Id. at 1119.
123. Id. at 1120. The Supreme Court has held that where there are First
Amendment claims, the appellate court must review the record independently.
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499
(1984).
124. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1121.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court could have held that the advertisement itself contained a
solicitation to commit a crime. Were this the holding, the speech would not be
protected by the First Amendment, and therefore could be regulated or even
barred without reaching the issue of whether such regulation was reasonable.
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 388 (1973). Thus, the issue would be resolved without risking a subse-
quent court's reliance on this opinion to expand the standard of care owed by
publishers.
The court may have considered this idea. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117. They
specifically note that commercial.speech "related to illegal activity" is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Id. (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S 557, 564 (1980)).
127. Id. at 1122 (Eschbach, J., dissenting). Judge Eschbach was in full
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plication of this law to the facts before the court. 128 He first argued that
the language of the advertisement was ambiguous and not patently crim-
inal as had been suggested by the majority. 12 9 Further, he doubted the
ability of the jury to properly apply the instructions as they, too, were
ambiguous about what constituted a clear solicitation for criminal activ-
ity.' 3 0 Because of these ambiguities, the Senior CircuitJudge dissented




The Fifth Circuit made two holdings in Braun. First, the court es-
tablished the constitutionality of a new standard of care for publishers:
A publisher is liable when it publishes an advertisement which, on its
face, poses an unreasonable risk of serious harm. Second, the court
held that liability could be imposed under this standard where a pub-
lisher printed an advertisement containing several specific phrases, in-
cluding "This Gun For Hire." However, the court's analysis in reaching
these conclusions will negatively influence the precedential value of this
case. Although the court dealt correctly with the law before it, its ap-
proach is somewhat confusing and leaves the decision open to varying
interpretations. Further, the court left no effective standards by which
to determine whether the newly approved standard of care had been
breached.
A. Standard of Care
The standard of care the court approved is beneficial to the public.
It imposes a reasonable duty of care on publishers of commercial speech
without unduly burdening them or chilling the press. Further, it is con-
sistent with prior case law. However, the approach the court took in
reaching this standard is confusing. Rather than dividing the analysis
into a risk-utility determination and a subsequent First Amendment de-
termination, the court should have incorporated the constitutional anal-
ysis as an element of the risk-utility analysis. The result would have been
a clearer, and thus stronger, precedent for publishers to follow.
The court's conclusion on the constitutionality of the standard of
care adopted by the lower court is consistent with Board of Trustees v.
Fox.' 32 There, the Supreme Court noted that where there was a sub-
stantial governmental interest at stake, commercial speech could be reg-
agreement "with [the majority's] imaginative interpretation of scant precedent."
Id. (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (EschbachJ., dissenting).
132. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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ulated or even barred.13 3 The substantial governmental interest in that
case was in "promoting an educational rather than commercial atmos-
phere on SUNY's campuses, promoting safety and security, preventing
commercial exploitation of students, and preserving residential tranquil-
ity."' 34 If such an interest is substantial enough to prohibit commercial
speech in dormitories, surely one could argue that the governmental in-
terest in preventing injury to the unsuspecting public resulting from
contract crimes legitimizes banning advertisements that could be inter-
preted as soliciting such activity.
Furthermore, the standard fills a gap left by Norwood and Eimann.
The former had held that liability could constitutionally be imposed in a
situation similar to that in Braun, but had not defined any standard.
Eimann established that whatever the constitutional boundary, publish-
ers had no duty to reject or investigate ambiguous advertisements. Braun
filled the gap between these cases by setting a standard that imposed
liability on publishers, but with more restriction than the standard re-
jected in Eimann.
The method the court used to set this standard, however, is confus-
ing. Rather than determining the standard, and then testing its constitu-
tionality, the court should have considered the First Amendment
protection as a component in the risk-utility analysis. Thus, the court
could calculate the cost of editing or rejecting those advertisements
clearly creating an unreasonable risk and the cost of the potential chill
on legitimate speech and weigh the combined costs against the
probability of an advertisement leading to harm multiplied by the grav-
ity of the harm should it occur. A standard could then be reached at a
point where the utility of free dissemination of information is balanced
with the risk of death or severe bodily injury resulting from the publica-
tion of such advertisements.
The court, in a round-about fashion, did consider these factors,
concluding that because the instructions ensured that liability could
have been imposed only if the advertisement contained a "clearly identi-
fiable unreasonable risk" on its face, the standard was correct.' 3 5 How-
ever, the divided route the court took to reach this conclusion may
weaken its value.
B. Was There a Breach?
Having established the standard of care, the court then applied it to
the facts before them, and found that that SOF had breached this stan-
dard of care. However, in doing so, the court declined to establish any
constructive guidelines for subsequent courts to follow.
The jury had concluded that SOF breached the standard of care in
133. Id. at 476-78.
134. Id. at 475.
135. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1122.
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publishing the "GUN FOR HIRE" advertisement.' 3 6 The Circuit Court
properly concluded that, because of the First Amendment issue, it was
required to review the record independently.' 3 7 The majority affirmed
the jury's decision, concluding that the advertisement, on its face, con-
tained a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk.'
3 8
The validity of this conclusion is somewhat undermined by testi-
mony presented in Eimann.' 39 In that case, an expert testified that the
wording of an advertisement did not reliably correlate to an advertiser's
willingness to undertake criminal jobs.' 40 Further, he noted that it was
the context of the advertisements placed in a magazine aimed at those
considering themselves mercenaries that made these advertisements
dangerous. 14 1 This leaves the question of whether the same advertise-
ment, placed in a different context (for example, the Wall Street Journal)
would be considered to clearly state an unreasonable risk.
However, it is not contradictory to hold that this particular adver-
tisement does "clearly indicate an unreasonable risk," even though
other advertisements may be more difficult to evaluate. Simply because
the exact line between publishable and unpublishable advertisements is
not known does not prevent the conclusion that this advertisement, with
its terms "Gun for Hire" and "All Jobs Considered," poses an unrea-
sonable risk.
Nevertheless, it seems that having established a new standard of
care for publishers, the court might have set down some constructive
guidelines for subsequent courts to follow. This might also provide
some guidance for publishers who seek to avoid liability.
V. IMPACT
Braun established the constitutionality of a new standard of care for
publishers, requiring that they reject any advertisement that, on its face,
poses an unreasonable risk of serious harm to a third party. The imme-
diate impact of this decision, and of the prior lawsuits in Norwood and
Eimann, can already be quantified: a recent issue of "Soldier of For-
tune" did not contain any personal service advertisements, facially in-
136. For a discussion of the jury instructions, see supra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text.
137. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1120 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)).
138. Id. at 1121.
139. See Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 832-33
(5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
140. Id. at 833. The expert had given up his effort to link certain code
words to crimes, concluding that even a seemingly innocuous ad had been
linked to crime. Id. The ad he referred to read: "Recovery and Collection. In-
ternational agents guarantee results on any type of recover[y]"; the ad was
linked to a kidnapping and extortion plot. Id. (alteration in original).
141. Id. The expert concluded that any personal service advertisement in
SOF could foreseeably be linked to crime. Id.
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nocuous or otherwise. 142 Given that the magazine carried over 2000
personal advertisements in the decade before these suits,' 43 advertisers
appear to have already lost a forum to disseminate legitimate
information.
The court's decision in Braun ends the relative immunity publishers
have enjoyed with respect to personal service advertisements. However,
because the court declined to provide guidelines on the application of
the standard of care, the potential future application by courts is un-
clear. As a result, this decision extends beyong merely imposing liability
on one publisher, but could potentially chill a large body of publishers.
While publishers need only edit advertisements to ensure that no possi-
bility of criminal solicitation is conveyed, in doing so they are likely to
err on the side of caution.' 44 Some magazines, like Soldier of Fortune,
may decide not to take the risk of tort liability and may decline alto-
gether to publish such advertisements.
Likewise, the implications this decision has for electronic publishers
are uncertain. To the extent that such publishers seek to publish classi-
fied advertisements, issues will arise as to what standard they must fol-
low.145 As these publishers currently may never see the advertisements
they publish, one issue that must arise is whether they will have a duty to
read each advertisement. Obviously, this would reduce some of the ben-
efits of such advertising. The uncertainty over the applicability of Braun
may inhibit would-be electronic publishers who are unsure of their po-
tential liability. This itself is a chill on publishers.
The court was correct to impose liability on SOF in this case. It is
imperative that people like Savage do not have access to a market to
peddle murder. However, because of the difficulty in predicting how
future courts will apply this new standard of care, the decision will lead
to a more substantial chill of the press than was necessary.
Brian J Cullen
142. SOLDIER OF FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Oct. 1992.
143. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 835.
144. Savage testified that Steele had asked to edit his advertisement, and he
had allowed this. The change was made from "[a]ny and all jobs considered" to
the published "[a]ll jobs considered." Braun, 757 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (M.D.
Ala. 1991).
145. Richard Neustadt has forecasted: "Classified ads should do particu-
larly well on electronic publishing, because the content can be updated quickly
and because home users can easily call up the page with the desired category
.... " RICHARD M. NEUSTADT, THE BIRTH OF ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 8 (1982).
646 [Vol. 38: p. 625
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss2/8
